Palestinian Women Contesting Power in Chaos by Jad, Islah
1 Introduction
This article examines what it means for women
to claim political representation in the highly
complex context of Palestine, one characterised
by Israeli Occupation and a deep rift over
political agendas and means of liberation.
Exploring how volatile political and
socioeconomic dynamics influence women’s
agency in politics, it addresses the challenges
women who seek to enter politics face; the
factors that enable them, and the nature of the
processes of mediating different political forces.
It argues that while direct political involvement
of women in the national struggle was an
important medium for women’s collective
empowerment, the call for affirmative action
needs to be analysed, with particular attention to
the nuances of its context. In the Palestinian
case, where political instability and Occupation
violence persist, the call for affirmative action
for women might not be the most effective
pathway for women’s empowerment. This is
especially so since the politically chaotic
situation has served to fragment women’s power
and their ability to act as a collective. Moreover,
while Palestinian women have historically been
politically active and have sought to integrate a
concern with issues of gender equality into
struggles for national liberation and social
emancipation for all, the way in which the quest
for more gender equitable political
representation has been externally engineered,
raises some serious questions with respect to its
democratic credentials. The interplay of foreign
and local dynamics and their implications for
Palestinians will be discussed at length.
2 Contextual background: politics and agency in
disarray
Affirmative action for women is highly
contextual in its dynamics and implications.
Quotas might increase the number of women in
public office, but the ability of these women to
affect a change depends on the stability and
dynamics of the political context. In the case of
Palestine, the introduction of quotas needs to be
set against a backdrop of persistent insecurity.
The Oslo agreement between the Israeli
government and the Palestine Liberation
Organisation in 1993 triggered an illusionary
process of ‘state building’, without leading to
peace or political stability. The Agreement was
born, not out of the strength of the local or
international positions of the PLO vis-à-vis Israel,
but out of the desperation of particular elites in
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the Diaspora, and it led to what became known
as the ‘self-rule’ areas of the Palestinian
Authority (PA). According to the Agreement, the
PA controls its population but does not have true
sovereignty, especially rights over land, resources
and external security. Bishara has argued that
‘autonomy – self rule, is a form of Israeli control
in which Palestinians agree to define and police
themselves as non-citizens’ (quoted in Parker
1999: xii). The Palestinian Authority was given
the authority over the self-rule areas for an
interim period of five years, heavily dependent
on donor aid and tightly constrained by Israeli
‘security’ measures and sanctions. The
Palestinian economy became the hostage of an
Israeli embargo – an economic siege – that has
sent unemployment rates soaring to 60 per cent
in some refugee camps in Gaza (Usher 1999: 15).
When the Palestinian leadership took power
after the Oslo agreement in 1993, the
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat refused to
organise new local elections, fearing the takeover
of the power by the Islamic movement Hamas,
its strong opponent. It seems that Arafat had
foreseen the political impasse that might face
the Palestinians once Hamas arrived in power. It
is important to stress here that elections were
requested by the Americans and funders, in an
attempt to establish a new basis for political
legitimacy in the Palestinian political system,
which had been reliant up to that point on what
used to be called the ‘national consensus’
(tawafoq watani in Arabic). National consensus
meant that major decisions affecting Palestinian
national struggle were taken within the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
structure that involved all Palestinian political
groups in the struggle for national liberation.
National consensus was based on the mediation
of the charismatic character of the historical
leader of the PLO Yasser Arafat and his
influence on other political groups under the
PLO. National consensus was used instead of
public elections (Hilal 1999). Excluded from the
national consensus were the Islamists and the
Palestinian Communist Party, as the latter does
not follow the path of military struggle as a path
to liberate Palestine.
After his death in August 2004, and under the
political pressure of the American administration
of Bush, the first local elections were organised in
stages that started on December 2004 and ran
until December 2005. The sweeping victory of the
Islamists in the first Palestinian legislative
elections in January 2006 forced the PA to stop
the final round of local elections, fearing the
control of Hamas of the remaining local councils.
Israel and Western governments refused to
acknowledge the result of the Palestinian
legislative elections. This hampered all attempts
to form a national unity government or any form
of government with Hamas in power. A wave of
assignation, imprisonment and torture targeted
the Islamic movements’ figures and leaders in
Gaza and the West Bank. The Hamas takeover of
Gaza led to a total rift between the PA, led by the
political organisation Fateh, and the Hamas
movement. Thus, the elections came to fragment
the Palestinian polity and society and contribute
to the marginalisation of social and political
movements that used to support women’s rights
and emancipation.
The rising power of the Islamists posed some
challenges to this process. The Islamists called
for electing all levels of leadership within the
PLO, a request that had been refused by the
historical leadership of the PLO chaired by
Arafat. Instead, the Islamists asked for a quota
that would represent their political weight
among the Palestinians, suggesting it should not
be less than 40 per cent of members of the
National Council, which is considered to be the
Palestinian Parliament and which elects the
Executive Committee, the highest authority
endowed with decision-making power. The
Executive Committee was never elected, but
again followed the national consensus
mechanism. This request was refused. The
Islamists used the local (2004–05) and legislative
elections (2006) as opportunities to show their
power, emerging from the elections in a very
favourable position, which did not prove helpful
in establishing a new source of legitimacy in the
Palestinian context nor in arriving at an
alternative national consensus. Islamist
participation, for the first time after the Oslo
Accord, in the local elections of 2004–05 and the
legislative elections of 2006, brought a huge
number of women to the vote (PCBS 2008).
The election results led to the division of the
Palestinian political system, a division that was
backed and supported by the international donor
community. This was aggravated by Hamas
taking power in Gaza on 15 June 2007, which led
Jad Palestinian Women Contesting Power in Chaos82
the Palestinian Authority, based in Ramallah, to
renounce the Hamas government as illegal. The
political split led to the paralysis of almost all
‘state’ institutions, whether the legislative
council, the judiciary or the executive branch.
Thus, parallel ‘state’ institutions were created to
represent the Hamas authority in Gaza and the
PLO authority in the West Bank. Consequently,
all legal reforms have been suspended and there
are severe hindrances to effectuating policies on
a national level.
This political split, coupled with the Occupation,
has incapacitated existing forms and institutions
of governance in Gaza. A total siege imposed by
the Israelis has blocked the Hamas government
from having access to financial resources,
whether of a local or international nature. This
has led to the paralysis of almost all local councils
that were won by the Islamists. Western donors
have refused to fund any project for councils run
by the Islamists. The Palestinian Authority has
attacked some of the councils that are run by the
Islamists, arresting some of their members and
replaced members with those loyal to the
Palestinian Authority. The persistence of a high
level of unemployment as a consequence of the
Occupation and the limits this poses on the
capacity of the Palestinian labour market to
accommodate new entrants, impedes the capacity
of local councils to undertake development
initiatives. Most of these councils work, if they
have the resources, to provide temporary part-
time jobs. The spread of checkpoints in the West
Bank and the siege on Gaza (air, sea and land)
further entrenches poverty, unemployment and
economic and political instability.
Before the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories
used to have a vibrant civil society with very active
engagement of political parties, unions, social
movements, charitable societies, students’
councils and women’s organisations. Almost all
forms of organisation used to organise regular
elections with a high level of participation. With
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority,
many forms of social organisation were targeted
by the Palestinian security forces, especially
Islamist organisations. This has led to a noticeable
level of de-mobilisation.
It is against this backdrop that the use of
affirmative action policies to enhance the
proportion of women in political office needs to
be understood.
3 Affirmative action in Palestine: feminist
aspirations between past and present realities
Reading the history of Palestinian women’s
activism teaches us that direct action and
involvement in the Palestinian national
movement was an important and empowering
medium for women’s collective action and
empowerment. Through their involvement in the
national struggle and politics, women constituted
themselves as a movement and gained important
access to the public space through a troubled
relationship with and against their national
leadership.
Women’s power in the ‘revolutionary’ era was
developed through the women’s collective action
in the national movement and against its
patriarchal structure. Thus, women affirmed
themselves through their own activism. From its
inception, the PLO was never much concerned
with issues of women’s empowerment, gender or
gender relations (Peteet 1991). The absence of a
well worked out commitment places a big burden
on the women’s movement to articulate and
formulate the gender interests of women in their
different social positions. Fateh policy has
consistently held that struggles other than
national liberation, are of a secondary nature,
thus denying an intimate relationship between
polity and society (Peteet 1991). One of Fateh’s
leaders, Mounir Shafiq, saw that ‘throughout the
different phases of the national struggle, women
did not separate themselves from the cause of
their people’ (Mounir Shafiq, cited in Al-
Ghounimi 1981: 201). While Shafiq sees that
women’s role is crucial in the ‘people’s war’ and
objects to those who seek to spare women the
‘trouble of taking part in the struggle’ (Al-
Ghounimi 1981: 206), he nonetheless maintains
that women should not challenge ‘traditions’
reflected in prevailing gender roles, in particular
in caring for their families and children (Al-
Ghounimi 1981: 224).
This vision was contested by women in Samed
(Palestine Martyrs Works Society), Fateh and the
General Union of Palestinian Women (Mai
Sayigh, cited in Al-Ghounimi 1981: 125). Women
started to pressure the leadership for a clear
position on the gender order. This pressure led to
a series of activities and debates, fed by some
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books and papers on women’s role in the
‘revolution’ (Abu Ali 1975; Al-Khalili 1977; Shafiq
1977; Al-Amad 1981). In one of these debates, the
head of the Union, Mai Sayigh stressed that:
women in the revolution, and even in the
military are still used as a propaganda façade
for the political organisation; women are still
far from playing a real role in the revolution
seen as the preserve of different organisations
in political competition and rivalry (Mai
Sayigh, cited in Al-Ghounimi 1981: 125).
Influenced by Marxist women, the head of the
Union went on to articulate the three forms of
the oppression of women as ‘the enslavement of
women to men; to the society and to the
Occupation’ (Essam Abdel Hadi, cited Al-
Ghounimi 1981: 123).
The ‘progressive’ ideology of the
Marxist–Leninist organisations in the PLO made
them more receptive to women’s pressures, but
did not alter their classical Marxist stand on
gender: women are oppressed but first the
national and class struggle must rid the people of
colonialism and then of capitalist exploitation.
They encouraged women to play an active role,
equal to that of men, in these struggles. All
avoided confrontation with the prevailing gender
order. Marxists, like most Arab male leftist-
nationalists, often strongly distinguished
between women’s liberation in the public sphere
and their sexual/bodily freedom, the latter being
viewed as superficial, bourgeois and
individualistic (Hasso 1997). The decline in
secular left ideology and a decline in women’s
power and activism in the national movement
reduced the achievements women’s movements
might realise. This is a conjuncture where the
Islamists’ power started to grow and the secular
nationalists’ power went into decline after 1993.
The Authority has neither gender vision nor a
political project for social change. Yet being
donor dependent, weak and fragmented, the
Authority has shown some positive reactions to
pressure from women’s collective action. The
quota is one outcome.
4 Affirmative action in Palestine
Affirmative action in Palestine has been
introduced on two levels, national and local. On a
national level, a policy of introducing 20 per cent
of seats for women has been instituted. The first
legislative elections took place in 1996 with no
quota for women. Five women out of 88 members
won Parliament seats, representing a mere 5.6
per cent. Activist women and leaders had refused
to call for a quota, thinking that they could gain
more seats than the quota might give them.
They had assumed that, based on their pivotal
role in national liberation struggles and their
participation in national politics, people would
vote for women equally as men.
After this defeat, women started to lobby to
introduce a quota into electoral law. Women
formed an impressive coalition and organised a
national campaign aimed at securing a quota for
women. The coalition was led by the General
Union of Palestinian Women, with active
participation from other women’s organisations
such as Women’s Affairs Technical Committee,
The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of
Global Dialogue and Democracy, Miftah,1 and
the Working Women Society. What triggered the
coalition was women’s lack of faith in their
political parties and groups to field women or to
support their candidature. The Islamists were
not part of the coalition. They were not asked to
join and they did not seek to join it. The
coalition’s leadership by renowned Fateh figure
Khadija Habashneh – who was also part of the
old PLO structure – gave women easy access to
top level leadership and to the media. Women
proved influential in lobbying politicians to
legislate for a quota.
The quota for local councils was introduced in
stages. At the beginning in 1998, the minister of
local government asked to add one woman at
least to each council. By 2000, the number of
women in local councils reached 63 out of 3,535
representing 1.7 per cent. The district system
with no quota for women proved to be hostile to
women’s participation, even while conforming to
a system of full proportional representation – a
system that has proven conducive to increased
levels of representation of women in other
contexts (see Ballington, this IDS Bulletin). In
2005, the local election law was amended to
introduce a 20 per cent quota for women.
In the local elections that followed, a significant
increase in women’s representation was
observed: 537 women out of 2,732 were
represented in local councils, representing 19 per
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cent. Women made up 30 per cent of candidates
and 50 per cent participated in voting. Thus, the
introduction of a quota was crucial to increase
the number of women in local councils. Yet the
levels of political representation by women
continue to disappoint Palestinian activists, who
had hoped for more progress towards parity,
given the significance of women’s role in the
national struggle. Efforts are underway to press
for quotas to be applied to other parts of the
electoral system, such as the district elections in
which there is currently no quota, historical
hostility towards women’s participation and very
low levels of female representation.
5 Women contesting elections in Palestine:
pathways to political office
In local councils, where women were known at
the local level and active in public life in roles
such as school headmistresses, teachers, and
social activists, they fared well in elections, while
those who had been chosen by their parties to fill
the electoral lists were, to some extent,
marginalised by their political parties or the local
councils after elections. Kinship played a
controversial role; in some places kinship ties
and support played a major role in promoting
women, in other instances, where male members
were determined to run, family ties played a
negative role in pressuring women not to run. In
general, in urban centres, party support was
crucial for women, and in villages and small
towns, both party and family support were
important for women’s participation.
With the weakening of political parties after the
Oslo agreement, especially the leftist parties, it
is to be expected that family and kinship
relations would play a more important role in
elections, beside the ruling party Fateh with its
security forces apparatuses. Historically
speaking, leftist parties were in the lead for
women’s political participation, followed by
Fateh, and they were all part of the PLO. Hamas
followed the same path, since the quota
encouraged them to field women to increase
their own political representation and their
political influence: Fateh also took this stand
(Jad 2008) but this stand does not stem from the
belief in a well spelled-out feminist agenda.
However, women used this chance by organising
themselves and shifting the political agenda to
their own benefit to ask for more power and
‘real’ representation. After the political split
between the West Bank and Gaza, for example,
the Hamas government in Gaza did not cancel
the Women’s Affairs Ministry. Women in Hamas
managed to run the Ministry and shift it towards
an agenda to defend women’s rights, using it to
call for their ‘development’.
Women’s movements and NGOs played an
important technical role in training and
equipping women for political office. The
women’s coalition of the Women’s Affairs
Technical Committee and the Miftah were both
crucial in training women candidates on how to
run an election campaign, how to fundraise for
it, how to mobilise support, how to mobilise a
constituency, how to deal with the media, how to
understand the role of the local councils, and
about the election law and the quota. Both
organisations worked on issues related to
leadership skills and self-assertiveness. But once
women were in political office, the role of NGOs
in supporting them and equipping them for their
new role was minimal. While NGOs could be of
support to women candidates, this role cannot
substitute political parties’ role in supporting
women politicians. NGOs, relying on a limited
project cycle for funding, cannot sustain their
work for women’s support in political office. The
Ministry of Local Government, in cooperation
with women’s NGOs, are working to bridge the
gap in reaching for women candidates once they
are in office. A call to establish a national
coordinating committee for all women in local
councils is one of the instruments used to reach
women after they have been elected. Whether
this new instrument will reach all women
irrespective of their political affiliation is a
challenge to be seen in the future.
On the whole, women’s performance in elections
relies on their political context. A woman
candidate in a council that is well supported by
donor funding is differently located than a woman
from the Islamist movement located in a remote
village with no support from the Ministry of Local
Government nor the donor community. Other
factors could play a role in evaluating the
performance of women, such as the level of
education, leadership skills, political training, the
support of her family and husband, and the
respect and trust of the local community. It can be
summarised that enabling political environment,
party support, family support and personal
qualities and skills are major factors for success.
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In order to shed some light on women’s activism
in politics and their pathways to political office,
four mini-profiles follow: Aisha Yassine from
Assirah Ashamalieh, Laila Shreime from Jenin,
Sireen Abu Muaisse from Al Lemghaire and
Hanan Abu Mashaikh from Al Maghazi in Gaza:
1 Aisha Yassine:  Assirah Ashamalieh (North). Aisha
finished high school and worked for a long
time as an art teacher in many Palestinian
communities. Married with children, Aisha
ran for election as an independent and
refused to be part of any party list. Her list [of
mainly independents] got the first four seats
with no quota. She attributes her success to
her social and community work before
election. She quickly proved herself in the
local council and got her family and her
community support. She believes that the
husband’s support is very crucial to a woman’s
success. She reflects: ‘Once I put my feet in
the council for the first time, I felt
intimidated, but quickly I learned and put
myself in many committees. I helped a lot of
women to get good training, good services and
to apply to many projects offered by the local
council’ (Mohamad 2008: 78). Aisha received
some training before the election from women
and from civil society organisations. She is
considering fielding herself again for the next
round of local elections.
2 Laila Shreime: Jenin (North). Married with
children, her husband and children did not
encourage her to nominate herself in the local
council, but encouraged her later on to be
elected. Her party (Fateh) encouraged her to
nominate herself. She used to be very active in
her community, working for many civil society
organisations and is an active unionist. She
commented, ‘When I started my first days in
the local council, I told the Hamas leader and
the other members “gone are the days of the
political rivalry, we are all now here to serve
our city, Jenin”’ (Mohamad 2008: 69). She was
well respected and welcomed by all other
members. She is active in many committees in
the council: the coordinator for the cultural
committee, the social committee, and the
women’s committee, a member in the
external relations committee and a member
in the human resource committee. She
complains about the siege that was enforced
on their council because it is headed by
Hamas, ‘I appeal to our President and to the
whole world to work to lift the political siege
imposed on our local councils, we want to
serve our people, we have many important
projects we work hard to implement like a
public slaughter house, three girls’ schools, a
garden, sewage system. Besides we have more
than 1,250 employees, who all need support’.
She is considering fielding herself again in the
coming local elections.
3 Sireen Abu Muaisse: Al Lemghaire (North). Sireen
finished high school and was active in her
community and a member of the General
Union of Palestinian Women. Her husband and
family encouraged her to run for election. The
main support for her came from the former
head of the local council who was from her
family, but his support came because she is
educated. In her first days in the council, she
was afraid and felt insecure, but later on it
became ‘normal’. She does not think to run for
the head of the council: ‘This is too much, too
far to reach and men could be better in this
post, they could achieve better since they can
reach further places than women. Besides with
the mentality of our men this might not be easy,
if our men change I will change too’ (Mohamad
2008: 91). Sireen and the other female
members who joined the local council were able
to get approval from Care International to build
25 water wells: ‘When we got this project, men
attributed this to themselves, but my colleague
refused and insisted on claiming our success,
she went and put on the mosque’s door a paper
congratulating us by name for securing the
construction of the 25 water wells’ (Mohamad
2008: 91). Sireen’s experience in the council
taught her ‘to call upon women to consult with
their daughters, to give them freedom, to trust
them, they have to have strong characters, a
strong character for a girl is equally important
as education, this is what I learned from my
experience in the council’ (Mohamad 2008: 92).
4 Hanan Abu Mashaikh: Al Maghazi (Gaza). Hanan
did not consider running for public office but
her party and her husband persuaded her, and
her family and community gave her strong
support. She had some training on the local
election, which was very useful in giving her
self-confidence and some important
information on her role as council member.
She organised a successful campaign, relying
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on home visits and personal contacts, ‘to
replace the absence of media coverage, but
the campaign was very tiring that I lost my
eight month pregnancy’ (Mohamad 2008:
169). Her loss was compensated in part by her
victory: ‘it was a big day and I promised my
voters that I will never let them down, I had
high hopes and was full [of] energy to do many
things to change women’s lives, but the siege
on Gaza crippled us from doing anything’
(Mohamad 2008: 170).
The above cases show that the quota was crucial
in triggering momentum for some women to enter
public office. Whether married or unmarried,
family support was an important factor in
enabling these women to embark on their political
careers. Political parties, too, were an important
medium. Political parties ‘chose’ some candidates
and persuaded them to run for elections, some of
whom – particularly for women in Hamas – might
be difficult to imagine as candidates in public
elections without the quota. People’s trust
through social activism was another important
factor behind their success. However, while the
quota created a conducive environment for these
women to be in decision-making positions, the
words of Laila Shreime from Jenin shows the
dilemma of women ‘empowered’ by affirmative
action: ‘I appeal to you, lift the political siege
imposed on our local councils, we want to serve
our people’ (Mohamad 2008: 72).
Affirmative action brought an important number
of women to public office for the first time in the
history of women’s political activism, however,
the political chaos and the enduring Occupation
led to the marginalisation of these voices to
effectuate political change amid the decaying of
the Palestinian Authority and the rift and
fragmentation of all forms of social organisation,
including women’s power.
6 Conclusion
Having secured 20 per cent of total seats in
parliament and local councils, Palestinian women
are faring far better in terms of participation in
political institutions than many of their Middle-
Eastern counterparts, who are neither living in
conditions of Occupation nor under a government
in extreme disarray. Even so, the current
situation falls short of Palestinian women’s
expectations. The initial focus of women’s
struggle was not the quota. Guided by the belief
that society will assume a non gender-biased
perspective when voting, because women have
been politically active as partners in a liberation
struggle, the Palestinian women’s movement had
thought that women’s full political representation
would be compromised rather than enhanced
with a quota. Yet the disappointing results in the
parliamentary elections suggested otherwise: the
coalition for a quota was in a sense a call for
recognition of women’s political voice and
presence, one that society had failed to make.
The low political representation of women in
district level elections where a quota was not
implemented, as opposed to local council
elections where it was instituted via a
proportional party list system, illustrates the
importance of affirmative action, and an acute
focus on the minutest details of its
implementation. The fact that the Islamists did
not participate in the coalition in favour of a
quota did not stop them from utilising the quota
to field female members who would then increase
the political force’s presence and clout. How far
women’s and men’s political participation will
continue in the political processes of the
upcoming elections remains to be seen.
The quota was enacted in a very disabling,
fragmented and disempowering context. The
election process proved to be highly divisive, and
external intervention did not help. The deep
polarisation between the PLO and Hamas had an
impact on women’s ability to overcome political
and ideological differences and work towards a
common agenda. The divisions in political and
civil society have continued to undermine,
making public office functional, for both men and
women. Furthermore, the Occupation and Siege
have meant that in some contexts, there is no
system of governance in place. Hence, we are left
with an ironic situation in which the quota has
brought women into a political office that is in
effect dissolved of any real political power to
implement policies and lead change. In such a
context, the question becomes: What kind of
political leadership can women exercise and how,
if the mechanisms of enforcing decisions or
initiating policies is stalled? Much negotiation
will be required in the next phase: the district
quota; the divisions in political society; the role of
civil society in the political process; the
differences in the women’s agendas of Hamas and
the PLO, as well as finding the capacity to make
political agency meaningful.
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Note
1 The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of
Global Dialogue and Democracy, Miftah, was
established in 1998 as a non-governmental
non-partisan Jerusalem-based institution
dedicated to fostering democracy and good
governance within Palestinian society.
www.webgaza.net/palestine/ngo_profiles/
Miftah.htm (accessed 2 July 2010).
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